last three years by Moreno's "betrayal." The problem Phone Number List with a campaign focused on that message was that, at the end of the Correa administration, even voters were dissatisfied with the state of the economy. As highlighted in a recent report by the Latin American Strategic Center for Geopolitics citing, in turn, a report by the National Phone Number List Secretariat for Development Planning1–, several socioeconomic indicators actually improved considerably in the period 2005-2016. (The discussion of how much of this is the identifiable Phone Number List causal effect of the policies of the.
Citizen Revolution and how much of the Phone Number List external determinants that favored the entire region, regardless of who was in charge and what the mechanisms were, is left for another day). The point is that several indicators saw a very notable improvement in the decade. But, as is well known, the evaluation of individuals in the economy, far from being an "objective" assessment, is almost always related to the sympathy Phone Number List hey have for the government. This is precisely what is observed when viewing public opinion data in Ecuador between 2008-2019, using the as an .two. Throughout Phone Number List this entire period, as expected, the had always held more favorable views of the economy than the anti-. But the direction of the trend changed around 2014-2016.
From that moment on, when Phone Number List the respondents responded retrospectively about their perceptions of the previous year, the also began to state that the situation was worse than before, and their assessment began to coincide with that of their opponents. The same change of direction is observed in the tendency of the perception of Phone Number List and about the personal economy and about the economic situation of their family. In other words, despite the real improvement in several social indicators (compared to those of the pre-Correa period, as far as Phone Number List official indicators allow us to see), in the final.